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Abstract 
This lecture deals with the role of the aircraft man-
ufacturer in the airline industry. The process will be illus-
trated by using a fictitious airline as an example--that is, 
a case study approach with "Mid-Coast Airways" serving as the 
example. Both in slide form and with supporting papers, a 
brief history of the airline, a description of its route 
structure and a forecast based on econometric analysis are 
presented. Once the forecast rationale is explained, in-
formation will outline the requirements for additional air-
craft and the application of new aircraft across the system 
using alternative fleet plan options. The fleet plan will 
be translated into financial summaries which will indicate 
the relative merit of alternative aircraft types, or operating 
plans. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19730024139 2020-03-17T09:38:44+00:00Z
I'm going to talk about the role of the manufacturer 
in the aviation and commercial field wi th particular emphasis 
on the marketing aspects of commercial aviation. 
The last time I looked, our advanced research and 
systems group had several proposals in various states of 
preparation or submission to NASA relating to a broad 
spectrum of projects. These included retrofit programs 
for the JT3D/JT8D engine, two segment approach programs and 
studies, experimental STOL vehicular development proposals, 
composite materials for STOL aircraft and a whole host of 
wide ranging projects. Now, this relationship has been going 
on for some time but it's primarily been handled by this 
group which has previously been part of our military organiza-
tion. We recently reorganized and brought into an overall 
marketing structure of what was formally our military sales 
group and is now called government marketing and I think the 
emphasis or the shift in NASA's approach to truly commercial 
problems signals a change in our company where we now, and 
I represent the commercial side strictly, will be dealing 
more and more in these kinds of problems. We are presently 
supplying people to a task organization to conduct a funded 
STOL system study and I'll talk a little more about that 
later. But, I think the shift of NASA's interest into 
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commercial programs of large scope signals or represents 
growing awareness on the part of the Federal Government 
through sociological and economic problems and I think 
that this interest is needed and certainly welcomed by the 
manufacturers and a discussion I had some time ago with a 
representative of the Port of New York Authority, he 
mentioned that the area encompassed by their jurisdiction 
crosses over some 1500 different political and labor 
entities and so I think that if we are about to achieve an 
effective STOL system we certainly need policies and 
institutions of the highest level for the federal government 
to cut across these jurisdictions and interests to establish 
an effective, viable, system where we can have land as 
required where we can develop safe control techniques or 
systems. I think that it is particularly important, however, 
that we recognize that if we are to achieve true sociological 
and technical advances that it has to be done recognizing 
the economic constraints that are applied to both the aircraft 
builder and the manufacturer. We're talking now about 
programs where the development costs exceed the net worth 
of the companies that are asked to develop the vehicles. 
The inability of private institutions to financing these 
entirely such as the programs of the SST and I am sure that 
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this will apply to any future major system development, 
demands that we get better ways of financing funding 
programs of this type. The second thing in these economic 
constraints applied to the users of the airplanes and if 
you look at the foundering of the SST program with the 
prolonged delays and high speed rail development in this 
country there is a doubtful future of aircraft like the 
Concord and I think you can relate more to the fact that 
those systems have yet to prove their economic merit than 
you can to ecological considerations although the ecologists 
may take credit for torpedoing the SST program. I wonder 
what the outcome would have been if that aircraft really 
had the economic promise that more conventional aircraft 
have. 
I think that it also is important to remember that 
whatever the Government does in terms of establishing 
policies and institutions to assist the industry we have to 
remember that it will be accomplished through private enter-
prise, that's the builder and the airline and the banking 
institutions. 
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Q. Are you stating that the Congress was aware that the 
SST did not have the economic problems? 
A. I think that there are many people that seriously 
questioned the economic viability of the SST. They certainly 
knew the Concord was not as economically attractive as the 
U.S. SST, but the cost of the airplane and the technical 
unknowns about its terms of maintenance and reliability I 
know had the airlines concerned. I think that that is a big 
part of the problems involved. If the airlines had aggres-
sively stated the case and I think that this was part of the 
problem of the entire SST presentation that really wasn't 
marketed very well. My hunch is that is was because the 
economic benefits were very difficult to prove. 
Q. Are you suggesting that there might have been some kind 
of a consensus that it was not economically viable. 
A. That may be too strong a statement, but in discussions 
that I had with various representatives of airlines the com-
mon theme was concern, doubt as to whether it was really 
going to be a money problem. That kind of question as far 
as operating costs, seat mile cost, etc., were never in 
question with the 747 or the rest of the subsonic airlines 
and you see now in the Concord to a much higher degree and 
it's a much smaller airplane, rising price tag. 
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Q. Of course, that was not a secret that -
A. That's right, but I think the focus was on ecological 
aspects and the noise factor. 
Q. I think that it was also a question on timing, too. 
Maybe the airlines would have been ready for something 
like that. 
A. Well, that's right, they were saddled with a tremendous 
investment for 747's and DCIO's and L-IOII's all at the 
same time or just preceding it. And then, you throw on 
that an economic recession starting in '69 when all airlines 
were all in trouble anyway. All I'm suggesting is that when 
your technology enables you to propose cert~n kinds of 
vehicles, I think that it's essential that those vehicles 
offer some sort of economic incentive to the ~r otherwise 
you might find that the operating costs are so high that they 
are not marketable. 
Q. We followed the vote very closely from the Aeronautic 
Space Council Staff's point of view on the SST and several 
votes throughout its history and my observation was that the 
final vote was more of an economic vote than an ecology vote. 
The Congressman who had initially voted in previous years 
against it on ecological grounds was now convinced that the 
threat was well enough defined to vote against it, but on the 
other hand, and it wasn't necessarily concensus, but there 
- 6 -
was a big uncertainty and they just didn't have the right 
answers from the manufacturers or the Government on the 
economics of the aircraft. 
A. Although that didn't get us many headlines. 
Q. Oh, no, the papers picked up the ecology issue. 
A. That's correct. Since 1920 when the Douglas Aircraft 
Company was founded, we've watched the phenomenon of com-
mercial aviation grow from an experiment to a national 
necessity of the first priority and because of this growth 
there has been a great many entrants into the manufacturing 
field, very few of them have survived. There are three 
manufacturers today in the united States competing for 
commercial markets: Boeing, Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas. 
Each of those companies has the productive capacity to satisfy 
close to the total demand. So we have an industry that is 
characterized by over capacity. This means that the com-
petition between builders is intense. It's resulted in very 
spotty earnings records through the years, not only for the 
three that survived, but for previous entrants. It means 
that there's tremendous competition between them for product 
differentiation. Each one strives for higher speeds, more 
passenger service features, larger capacities, all those 
things that drive development costs upward, at the same time 
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price competition working to keep the margin between costs 
and sale price very narrow. It also drives the break even 
point of the aircraft much higher than the builders would 
like to see it and this competition is passed on to the 
airlines because as a regulated industry where they are 
regulated in respect to what they can charge for a seat to 
the public they too seek product differentiation and they 
seek advantages that they can advertise in order to maximize 
their share of the market. So we have a combination of high 
development, high competition between both builders and users 
and it might be argued that what the industry really needs 
is either fewer competitors or more regulation within the 
industry. But, I would argue that given those as problems 
we can still say that the 707 and DCa are better airplanes 
because of that competition and that the 737 and the DC9 
are better airplanes because of tlE competition and that the 
LID-II and the nclO are better because of competition. So, 
I'm submitting that there is a great deal of merit in the 
basic structure where you have a highly competitive situation 
in terms of the quality of the end product. I think that one 
factor overrides the easy way out which would be to control 
capacity or to regulate it in such a way as to minimize the 
problems attendant to both the airlines and the builder. One 
other thing about this competition was the carrier seek or 
u1D 
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or the builder seek product differentiation as to the 
carriers. This means that the airlines are going into 
re-equipment cycles before their existing aircraft are 
fully depreciated or obsolete. What I think we need are 
Government policies which sustain competition, which are 
aimed at protecting the economic health of both the aircraft 
manufacturers and the airline. 
I mentioned that I am going to focus tOday on marketing 
and this is merely the beginning as to where it all started 
as far as how you go about developing an aircraft. I think 
that marketing is appropriate here because it is in the 
marketing area where all the social, technical, economic 
barriers are brought to focus. It is there that the success 
or failure of a given idea is going to be achieved. Marketing 
is also the principal line of communication between tre 
builder and the airline. At Douglas we have a fairly con-
ventional marketing organization. Sales is the most visible 
group, it's the principal agency of contact with the airline 
and they are the spokesman to the outside world, but the 
sales group represent less than 15% of the total marketing 
organization. The rest is composed of engineers, economists, 
financial analysts, schedulers, a whole host of specialists 
that develop and support a case for the aircraft. TO this 
you can add the entire resources of our engineering organiza-
tion, our legal and contract group and the products support 
&'1{ 
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groups for after sales support. The marketing process 
encompasses a very large number of men. If we look at the 
sub groups within our marketing organization we can first talk 
about our advanced transportation concept groups. Now, this 
organization is charged with the responsibility of relating 
technical possibili till s downstream against what they see of 
the environmental needs to be out into the future and they 
are going out tOday to about the year 2000. Their purpose 
is to keep Douglas Aircraft in the mainstream of air trans-
portation and it's easy to get off track as you can see by 
the number of companies that have been in the field and have 
somewhere failed to come up with the right product at the 
right time. We have a similar group relating the cargo 
development where they're studying the emerging infra structure 
of inter-modal transport of containerized cargo and their 
emphasis is todetermine how and when the very large cargo 
airp~ane will make economic and technical sense for both 
this nation and other nations throughout the world. At this 
point, maybe if we can turn the projector on .... 
The advanced transportation concepts group prepared this fore-
cast of world traffic and they've done this in a factor 
technique where if you say we're at about an index of one 
here by the year 2000 we're going to be up past 20, which 
means that there is a great tremendous growth potential world-
I 
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wide for air travel. These two lines represent out to this 
point, the low band and the high band in our market research 
forecast through the year 1980. Beyond they've taken a 
number of techniques to extrapolate out into the year 2000. 
They've used delphi techniques and a lot of intuitive judge-
ment. The band out here as you can see is quite wide so there 
is, the further out you go in the time the vaguer it gets 
and grayer it gets, but, even if you assume that the low band 
is the more reasonable, we're still talking about the factor 
of 8 times the growth by the year 2000. 
There will be a definite break in the period around 
1985. I don't know why they did that. It could be that 
they're saying that at that point of time they can't tell any 
more but they think that there is a maturing of world markets. 
The group that I'm responsible for is presently going out to 
1981 and these fellows simply take it beyond there. 
Another interesting part of this growth pattern though, 
is what they see as how that travel is going to be accomplished 
and this is the greatest pointer that l've ever seen. It's 
very appropriate. What they're saying is that really the 
classic modes are going to persist clear out into the year 
2000 with short range aircraft accounting for about 13% of the 
total,medium range 19% and transcontinental 13%, interconti-
actually coming down, SST is now becoming a very big factor 
ft;73 
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by that time, long ,range represents aircraft going some 
5000 miles or beyond, equivalent to the 747 or the long 
range DCIO's and STOL now is beginning to emerge as a real 
factor. I should point out that this is in terms of RPM's. 
Now you say that 8% of the total may not seem like very much, 
but it terms of people it could be a great deal. One man 
traveling from here to London accounts for 6000 RPM's, excuse 
me, say from Los Angeles to London, and that's the equivalent 
of say, 20 people going from Los Angles to San Francisco. 
So we could be talking about a very large number of people 
but yet generating a few RPM's out of the total. 
I think what we're saying here is that STOL and Feeder 
Aircraft do not necessarily, they're doing the same service 
but they're not the same airplane. It's a mix. 
Q. Is this the world market or is this the domestic market? 
A. That's world. 
Q. DO you see any VTOL by 2000? 
A. No. That did include helicopters. 
Q. How do you differentiate the long range and trans-con? 
A. Transcontinental is, let's say, 2500 miles. 
Q. Is that somewhere in long, short or medium range? 
A. This we're talking about 727 type range capability. Out 
to trans-con 2500 miles, inter-continental is 3500 and long 
range is beyond that. The Tel/Aviv/New York type are going 
~74 
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above 5000 miles. 
Q. If I perceive correctly,you're present short range are 
in three segments; STOL, short range and medium range on 
both of the diagrams. Are you saying that the medium to 
short range are going to be unchanged? 
A. But the mix between STOL and DC9 and 737 and the kind of 
equipment that we are shifting towards. STOL 
Q. Does this include charter service? 
A. I believe that this is scheduled. Well, no, I take that 
back. I think it does include charters. 
Q. I think a way to look at that is that the STOL Feeder 
business might be as much as 8~/o of the day's total. 
A. I'm sure it is. You'll see later that I have some fore-
cast of aircraft numbers by type and I think that we're saying 
that by 1980 that there are some 480 STOL aircraft. 
Our Market Research Group is charged with more near term 
responsibilities and I mentioned earlier that we are working 
on a funded NASA study STOL system and we have actually as-
signed or loaned people to a task-oriented group and they're 
presently going through exhaustive analysis of a major po-
tential STOL system as to what the capture would be within 
the market. What the trade-offs are in terms of range against 
surface desireability on the part of the consumer and what 
the economics of the aircraft would have to be the make of 
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the craft. It's a pather interesting study and a rather 
complex one. We went through the same kind of analysis 
several years ago when we were trying to decide whether to 
build the DCIO and it all started with an analysis of the 
potential economics of an aircraft and big discussions with 
airlines as to what kind of operating costs levels they were 
seeking, what comfort standards were they after, what kind 
of improvements in systems in terms of all-weather capabilities 
and a whole host of trade studies in which you try to deter-
mine what kind of an airplane truly makes sense in the market 
for the period you are designing the building to. Our goal 
was to develop an airplane that would have as broad an appeal 
as possible and you achieve this through what we call opera-
tional flexibility. This involves a number of considerations, 
the effective range of treaircraft, its takeoff and landing 
performance to enable it to work out of a host of airports, 
the all-weather flexibility, there are a number of keys that 
we focused on. The total market estimate was very critical 
to this decision because we knew we were going to invest over 
a billion dollars in developing the aircraft and that exceeded 
our net worth, so you have to get to some pretty reasonable 
estimates of how many of these airplanes you can sell or 
you are really facing a disaster. When you think of the 
experience with the 10-11 and the engine problem you find 
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out how critical this can become. You may recall that at 
the time we were offering the airplane we said we'd build it 
if we had a total of 50 firm orders from at least two major 
airplane manufacturers. We got American Airlines to commit 
to 25 firm and 25 options. Following that Lockheed, who was 
also in the race got a spate of orders from TWA and Eastern, 
Northeast, Delta, and Air Canada, and at that point our 
program was really on the ropes. united then committed 
to the DCIO and with that we had our quota. (They bought 
30 firm and 30 options). With that we had sufficient orders 
to commit to a firm program and we started building the 
airplane. Because of the lead that LOckheed had jumped into 
we wanted to overcome this and broaden our customer business. 
We were fortunate in that we had committed to the General 
Electric company for our engine development and that they 
had early in the game come up with a growth version of the 
CF6 engine. We were able to convert this additional thrust 
into higher design weights in order to achieve greater range. 
We now have four models and as you can see, the basic airplane, 
series 10, which American, United and National are operating 
tOday, is pm·,,·ared"by a 40,000 lb. thrust engine. It's 
maximum takeoff Weight is 430,000 Ibs. and its range is 
about 3670 nautical miles. When we go to the long range 
version, the CF6-50C our thrust is gone up to 51,000 Ibs. 
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We can then go to higher design weights, greater fuel 
capaci ties and increase the range up ,to 5300 nautical miles. 
We also had Pratt Whitney in the competition with their 
derivitive engine of the JT9-D which produces 50,000 Ibs. 
of thrust and again the same design weights, the airplane 
is slightly heavier than the GE version so the range is not 
quite as great but it is actually the next one that will be 
certified and that will happen this fall. We also went to 
convertible freighter versions and we've sold those in CF 
powered versions. They can carry 158,000 Ibs. payload for 
3150 nautical miles so in the passenger version the range 
is about equal or in the passenger mode is about equal with 
the standard passenger airplane, so that's given us additional 
flexibility and because of this we have now broadened our 
customer base to 25 airlines. Seven carriers have bought the 
series 10 airplane: American, continental, Delta, Lakair 
is the next one (it's a charter carrier based in London), 
National has bought the basic airplane, united and Western. 
Northwest bought the series 20 with Pratt Whitney engines 
primarily because they believe very strongly in engine com-
monality. They're a large 747 operator and they felt that 
the common overhaul line would justify that going to an 
airplane with slightly lower performance levels. The con-
vertible aircraft has been bought by Martin Air charter 
~1g 
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which is an operator based in Holland, 0 & A, Sabena, and 
TIA and the long range GE power aircraft has been ordered by 
El Mexico, Air Afrique, Air New Zealand, Alitalia, Atlantus, 
Fin Air, Iberia, KLM, Luftansa, National bought the long 
range version for their Miami/London flights and finally 
SAS, Swiss Air, UTA and Viasa. Now there are a number of 
carriers that have yet to come into either the 747, the 
LIO-ll or DCIO. The competition is very keen for those 
remaining operators and now we have the A300B, the French-
British product, coming into the scene actively marketing 
in the united States throughout the world within a twin 
powered wide cabined aircraft. 
Q. Do you know the total rack up of the three airplanes? 
A. We sold, including options, 240 airplanes. I think 
the 747 is about 210. I'm not sure on the count. 
I might mention here that despite Lockheed's problems, 
they're tough competitors. I think that their airplanes are 
going to work fine. They've been hurt because of the engine 
delays because we've broadened our customer base. But the 
future looks very bright for them in Great Britain and there 
are still a lot of people out there who haven't bought them. 
Q. As I recall, Lockheed preceded you people in this type 
of aircraft. Can you elaborate a little bit on that and 
your view of the 747 and this type of aircraft and why you 
felt you should go into this type of aircraft as opposed to 
perhaps some other area. You knew that you were going to get 
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high competition. It seems to me that when two or three 
companies are all competing for the same market perhaps 
they would do better if they would kind of divide their 
market upsurge. That's an over-simplified way of putting 
it, but I'd like it if you would elaborate a little bit more. 
A. I think there are a number of reasons. One, our growth 
estimate told us that there was healthy growth despite the 
immediate problems that were facing us. The 747, we believe, 
was going to have tremendous passenger appeal and here we 
we~e building stretched DC8's that we saw just could not 
compete around the major routes of the world against the 
wide cabin airplane, so our choice then was whether to enter 
it or abandon the field and I think at this point that emotion 
creeps into it. We just hate to give up without a fight. 
Secondly, we felt the 747 was oversized for the 1970's. It 
represented about a tripling in capacity from the standard 
DC8/707's and this jump and there were reasons why the 747 
was the size that it was. A lot of developments on that 
airplane had been accomplished through the C5 competition. 
We felt that there was logical gap in size between standard 
body forms in jets and the 747 that would serve as a better 
vehicle for less dense routes and that's a compliment to 747 
service on off time, off day service and I think we proved 
right. I think that the airplane is going to be quite successft 
bOO 
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We started out with twin engine air bus and American 
Airlines had written us back for a twin engine air bus, 
but when we went around to the other airlines we couldn't 
find anyone else that wanted that airplane. They all 
wanted more range, more takeoff flexibility. They 
wanted to be able to operate out of Denver and Mexico City. 
You just can't do it with two engines and go anywhere so 
the trade study said that it had to be a three engine air-
plane. If you go to three engines when you've got the 
takeoff performance and the enroute cruise performance to go 
to transcontinental and of course when we got the growth 
engine we could go a long way. 
Q. I have been told that the market analysis groups of both 
Lockheed and Douglas predicted more than break even sales for 
both companies building essentially the same airplane. Is 
that true? 
A. Yes, that is true. And I think that the total market is 
there if we assume that everybody gets an equal share. I 
think they will. While we've done all this product differ-
entiating we haven't done that without a price either. We 
might break even here. 
Q. What are the numbers up to 500/600? 
A. I can't answer that question for two reasons. It's a very 
closely kept number but at the time of the congressional 
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was to reduce their price and they were very successful 
and sold five of the airlines practically within a week. 
We met that price and made a comparable reduction and passed 
that back to American and the competitive factors keep both 
cards pretty neat. The bankers get involved where they look 
at your estimates,do they believe the costs estimates of 
manufacturing. And then in turn do they believe that you 
are going to be successful. They do have a lot to say about 
whan an aircraft company can do if it's heavily committed to 
a long term gap, as to new programs, derivitive programs, 
developmental programs. 
Q. What would happen if you had gotten to a point where you 
would never break even. What would trebanks have to do then? 
A. I can't answer that, but I think that it's a pretty 
fundamental thing, unless you make some money somewhere along 
the way, you're going to cease to exist. In 1966, Douglas 
was selling aircraft faster when our bankers forced us into 
a merger simply because the cost of the manufacturer was 
exceeding the sales price of the aircraft. Now, what 
MCDonald brought to the Douglas company was a lot of money 
and there was a lot of restraint on his part as to how to 
get Douglas Aircraft out of trouble. We elected to middle 
management and we felt that we had a sound engineering group 
and a sound basic middle management and they left us pretty 
much alone with some key people coming in with manufacturers 
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wondering what they could look at and what we were having 
some problems with, but within a couple of years we have 
turned around and we/ve been fairly profitable since and, 
by industry standards, profitable. 
Q. Were you not experiencing a very difficult training 
period? 
A. Oh, yes. We had, I can't remember, I think there was 
something like 3/4 of the people in production that had been 
there less thana year. 
Q. There was a high turnover as I recall and many people who 
you were training would work for a couple of weeks and then 
leave. 
A. Turnover was high and experience was low, coupled with 
some vendor delays of engines and landing gears. 
There was a kind of a remarkable recovery but to come 
back to another question, why did we get in, here is a more 
current forecast of where we see us going from today up until 
1980. It's a healthy growth rate close to 12% per year for 
total services with a growing in non-scheduled areas as we 
go up toward 1980. 'That means that in order to supply that 
there are going to be a lot of new airplanes built and here 
are estimates as to what is going to happen to the world 
fleet composition through the year 1980. There will be a 
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phase out of the conventional props and turbo props, they'll 
be down to about 700 by the end of the decade. The DC9, 737, 
Caravelle, BAClll still had some growth left in them primarily 
because operating airlines are still reordering and it looks 
like we're estimating that the fleet will grow to a maximum 
of about 1560 by 1976 and at about that time we see those lines 
closing down and then a gradual decay as we go out into time. 
727 -- there is a lot of life left in the 727 and Boeing has 
done a remarkable job of modernizing that airplane and 
stretching and increasing its range, making the interior more 
attractive and it's showing up in the past few months in rather 
remarkable sales. The older DC8's, 720's, 990's we see phasing 
out and they've already started going out and will be down 
quite low by 1980 and the conventional 8's and 707's also 
starting downhill about now getting down to the low 900's by 
1980. TO replace that and to accomodate the growth that we 
have shown on the previous chart, we'll see a remarkable 
growth in numbers of short and medium range wide cabin air-
craft that includes now the A300B, the DCIO twin if there 
is one or any other competitive twin in the U. S. plus LIO-Il's 
and DelO's. Long range aircraft are composed primarily of 
747, long range DCIO's and long range 10-11's and you can see 
that there is a lot of aircraft to be built in the next ten 
years. STOL just emerging will be growing by 1980 to 470 units, 
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supersonic aircraft primarily. Now the Concord coming in 
1976 and we are saying 87 units by 1980. 
Q. Would you comment on the USSR? 
A. That excludes the USSR. I don't know much about them 
except that they're beginning to aggressively market in 
neutral and satellite countries and in some of the countries 
in Western Europe and they have a pretty good family of con-
ventional aircraft jets. They've got the Illutian family 
of aircraft, the tri-jets, four engine jets, long range air-
planes, YAK-40's. They've got a lot of airplanes and they're 
trying to sell them. I think they've got some very difficult 
problems in marketing the Western countries because they have 
a very bad track record at home and among their satellite 
nations as far as product support goes. The SST is anybody's 
guess. 
Q. How about Communist China? 
A. That's an interesting area,for Boeing, as you know, has 
had a sales team there and the going export license was 
granted last week and I think that somebody will sell them 
some airplanes and we have people in contact with them as 
well. How much is there and how soon is a difficult question. 
The country is under-developed in all modes of transport as 
far as rail and highway systems and it could be argued that 
maybe air would be the cheapest and the fastest way to get 
a travel system and a domestic transport building in China 
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although I don't know their labor costs are bound to be low 
and maybe building highways would be cheaper, but for foreign 
international travel they've indicated that they are inter-
ested in going into other countries and I think we'll see 
some action. In the long range the potential is huge, with 
800 million people. 
Q. What are your estimates as to the passenger capabilities 
on the STOL feeder jets? 
A. That's in the trade study area now, and the last I heard 
they were talking about 100 seaters. It's very tough to 
get very good economics with 100 seat STOL aircraft. I 
think in the long run it might be bigger but then if you do 
that you cut down on the size of the network so I don't think 
it's any better now than to just guess from my point of view. 
Q. Why did Douglas close the DC8 while Boeing kept open the 
707? 
A. We just couldn't sell any more DCS's. 
Q. I thought that it had the lowest operating costs in the 
country. 
A. It is, the DC8-60. But the problem you run into is one 
of who are your customers, your established customers? The 
DC8-61 is not a long range aircraft and I think Boeing 
production is pretty much limited to their 320B's which is 
the intercontinental aircraft. Now they're kind of struggling 
~g0 
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as well and I don't see so much more in the way of sales 
for their company. 
Q. Will the continued production of the DCS steal from the 
DClO? 
A. Yes, but if we had had our way we would have delayed 
the DClO because we have a very good airplane and a very low 
cost airplane and we built a lot of them and we're making 
money on them. Everything argues the delay except the com-
petitive factor with the 747. 
Q. You made a reference to the economics of a 100 passenger 
airplane as pretty poor. Is this an implication that its 
technology that has to be developed in this area or is this 
an implication that manufacturing structures are so hard, or 
have they gotten so big? Has this created a problem, or is 
it something that just relates to a 100 passenger airplane? 
A. I base that on what I understood the study price to be 
and I think it was somewhere around $12 million. Now you're 
getting a lot for this, you're getting STOL capability, but 
with a hundred seats and $12 million the cost per seat mile 
ran very high so unless you can increase the capacity and once 
you've got a basic airplane you can stretch it once you've 
got 50 more seats as this would just improve the seat cost 
tremendously. 
Q. Is the cost of the technology STOL performance as great 
in the transcontinental area? 
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A. Sound is one thing, smoke, all weather are all part of 
the performance. There are a lot of variables and you Can 
compare the costs against all these things and you'll find 
that you just can't get them for nothing, and eventually 
it's tested in the market place. 
Q. When you say STOL, what band of runway lengths do you 
mean? Does that include up to 4000 feet (RTOL)? 
A. Yes, but we'll say down at 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000 and 
for each one you've got a different price level and a different 
engine problem and different augmentor systems. Now let's 
assume that from our own internal purposes we've got an 
airplane that needs some real requirements for the future 
and we're going to go ahead with it but the problem then is 
to convince the airlines that they really ought to buy it 
against competitive aircraft being marketed. We see our 
development sales case as a two faceted problem and the 
first being performance. We have a large sales engineering 
group that looks at the aircraft being offered to the airline 
in terms of the airlines operating environment. We're blessed 
at Douglas and the same is true of the other manufacturers 
with very extensive computer facilities that are there 
primarily because of design and manufacturing requirements 
but since we do have them we can use them for other things 
and a lot of our marketing efforts depend on computer support. 
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When we look at performance of an airplane, we have flight 
simulation models, which will fly the aircraft over every 
route that we anticipate the airline using the aircraft and 
these models compute the allowable takeoff weights, taking 
into account runway obstacles, temperatures, elevation, wind, 
they compute fuel burns for the route taking into account 
any airline ground rules that are in imposed such as enroute, 
navigational tolerances, delays, reserve requirements of 
destination, fly through capabilities, it's a very flexible 
program and it also computes costs for the flight according 
to the ground rules specified by the airline. So, when 
we are done with the performance analysis we can go to the 
customer and with some confidence say yes, the airplane will 
satisfy every mission which you would ask of it or it will 
do them all except one, two or how many routes there are or 
perhaps because of runway lane, all up loading limits on the 
airfield or routes that exceed exchange capabilities, but 
anyway the airline then knows what the aircraft will do. But, 
it's not enough that the airplane can do the job that it has 
to do in an economic fashion. 
That just says that a DClO-IO when compared against a 
DC8 or 707 has a much lower break even load factor and a much 
greater profit potential primarily because the seat costs 
are 25% less. Now it is true that it takes more passengers 
to break even but if you put in routes where the traffic is 
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indicated to be reaching levels that will generate some 
good profits for the airline. This is based on a 140 seat 
airplane against a 270 seat airplane and assuming a yield 
of 6¢ per passenger mile and it assumes the transcontinental 
flight. 
Q. DO you mean costs, not profit? 
A. That's the fare divided by the number of miles and 
diluted to account for non-revenue passengers, discounts, etc. 
Q. What's the primary reason for the DCIO's being more 
sufficient than the standard jet? 
A. It's just a lot bigger and a lot more efficient engine 
and when you break it down in terms of costs per seat, cost 
per mile and cost per seat mile, it's just a more efficient 
airplane and that's the productivity game of the jumbo jets 
or wide cabin jets are bringing (economy of scale). 
Q. Isn't the thesis being advanced that the 727 even with 
2~fo higher SFC that you can have more seats because it costs 
30% less per seat comes out to the seat mile operating cost 
total and that's the interest? 
A. Well, what we're showing here is profit based on total 
operating costs where we're taking into account all the de-
preciation charges and later on in the financial step I'll 
show you how interest can effect this total. The original 
type aircraft we mentioned is. 
Q. The 727. It seems that its been hitting the DCIO and 
6~ 
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a couple of others head on because of its lower cost per seat 
encourages 30% lower and because of the economy of scale in 
the lower SFC of the DCIO and all its tradeoffs don't make 
it look like its always an economic advantage. 
A. Well. we say we'll beat the 727's. 
Q. What we're trading off here seems that the airplane 
costs per chairs is lower on the DCIO but what you're trying 
to do does not require the larger airplane than the effective 
seats that you're utilizing have a higher cost than the DCIO 
and so it's essential that you can't put a big airplane on a 
low demand market and it's the market that needs replacing. 
A. The most critical decision that the airline has is to 
put the right sized airplanes on routes where traffic will 
support it in two ways; in capacity we have to have a reason-
able load factor and you have to be able to provide a 
competitive level of frequency. It's a nice balance. Well. 
so we've proved that the airplane is economic and can make 
money;there are other ways to improve your competitive 
posture and one is by offering more comfort and this cross 
section shows the kind of things we're working with when 
you're comparing a wide cabin airplane with a standard jet. 
You get out of the tube. you've got the 8 feet high ceilings, 
the broad aisles, broader seats, the flexibility that comes 
under the deck with lower galley arrangements, the contain-
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erized cargo possibilities, it's just a much more appealing 
airplane and the passenger benefits from both of these factors. 
The airplane can operate under a much lower fare structure 
than it would otherwise because it has more productive air-
craft. The airplanes are more comfortable and are more 
reliable and have more passenger service features and there 
are two way benefits. But, even given all this,and I'm 
coming back to your question, it's a great airplane, it's 
got a lot of passenger field and still can mean a financial 
disaster if it isn ',t matched to the market. What happened 
to the airlines in 1970 is that they had a tremendous 
amount of 747"s, pre-delivered payments on the DClO's and 
10-11's and at the same time a recession occurred and load 
factors fallout and highly competitive system and there 
just wasn!t enough revenue to cover all the costs that kept 
recurring. The result was that the industry lost something 
like 100 million dollars. So, we spend a lot of time at 
Douglas trying to develop better ways to forecast traffic. 
Increasingly, as far as forecast in the united States goes, 
we are relying on econometric techniques and basically we're 
saying that revenue passenger miles are a function of personal 
consumption expenditures with the velocity of many being simply 
the GNP being divided by the money supply. The yield that 
the airlines charge and the passenger trip length which is 
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the major service standards. It grows and grows because 
more and more non-stops services are being provided between 
cities so that what use to be a 2 or 3 segment flight may 
now be a non-stop and so that your average passenger trip 
length is one. Now when we do this, and I'm talking here 
about forecasting u.s. traffic in total. You're forecasting 
a lot of other variables instead of the depending variable. 
We go to the Wharton School in Pennsylvania for estimates 
of the various economic indices such as gross national 
product and personal consumption expenditures and then we 
plug that back in to this variable. The one that has given 
us the most trouble is yield because its tough to know where 
yields are going, and I'd defer getting into that for just 
a few slides because I think that I have a chapter that 
explains it a little better. But, when we compare what we 
estimate in the econometric models and this one happens to 
be a model of the U.S. scheduled service against historic 
performance where we plug in the achieved explanatory 
variables we get almost a perfect correlation of the past 
traffic growth, which says that if you forecast the variables 
that we are putting into your format accurately you're going 
to get a very accurate traffic course. 
Q. What's the number of years before the actual estimate 
is made? 
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A. It doesn't matter when its made. We could make this chart 
today. All we have to know is what the PC yields, the 
passenger trip lengths, etc. 
Q. Can the estimate be made before the actual or is it a 
result of correlation of the actual? 
A. The task of whether your model is good is whether it 
can reproduce history. Now the future will only be as 
good as our estimate of both variables that go into the 
formula. I should say that those variables are more stable 
and more subject to analysis than the dependent variable 
which is RPM's. 
Q. So the estimate really reflects the information taken 
from historical data. 
A. The validity of the model depends on testing it against 
actually what happened in the test. So, using that we can 
then say that this is a forecast of U.S. domestic traffic 
and we're coming up with a total of 11.2% for scheduled 
service within the U.S. These are the eleven trunks. This 
is the local service plus intrahawaiin and intra-alaskan 
trunk. Now, we also have models that will forecast actual 
airline traffic using the same econometric techniques. Now 
here you get some differences in variables such as what's the 
historic share of the market, of the carrier within the total 
industry. But, I've gone here to ficticious airlines because 




proprietary information. NOw, moving on knowing the 
forecast, knowing what the airlines are planning to do 
about its existence, knowing what it has on hand and on 
order, we can generate a seat mile demand and what current 
aircraft on hand and on order will supply and this then 
represents the gap that must be filled by adding on an 
aircraft and so you can see what Mid Coast, which is a 
very large airlines, operating both internationally and 
domestically. We're forecasting a tremendous growth on the 
DClO equipments, wide body twin equip, to satisfy the seat 
mile gap which I had shown earlier. But even this is not 
enough for an airline to make a decision as they have to 
have city fare forecasts so that they can relate aircraft 
schedules to expectant passenger travel. So, we then look 
at each city pair within the airlines networks and we take 
into account a host of demographic and social factors, 
political considerations, competitive factors on their systems 
and taking historic data to establish a time series. We then 
project taking into account these influences to come up with 
a city pair forecast. Once we've done this then we can show 
how many weekly passengers are expected between each city 
pair on their system. Given this we can then go to our 
airline planning group which has got a scheduled planning 
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group which has got a scheduled planning and evaluation 
level which will flow that traffic over the airline system 
and develop successive aircraft fleet schedules out as far 
as we care to go and this schematic simply says that on 
Flight 10 originating in San Antonio and ending Chicago 
we have 967 passengers in an average week joined by 6 on 
line connecting passengers from Portland and Seattle, 5 
from Mexico City, 23 from Corpus Christi. Those totals 
then flew to Houston where 695 got off, 1310 originated, 
25 connected from Corpus and we got 1647 ending up in 
Chicago, and we do that for the entire airline system. In 
short, what we do is develop a liable flight plan and a 
viable schedule which takes many years of forecasting. Now 
the model allocates on the basis of looking at each routing 
and comparing against the total service·offered on that 
route. The variables if it is a daily service, bi-weekly or 
five a day or whatever it is. The air traffic capacity and 
the customer attributes of the aircraft, what are the departure 
and arrival times, etc. Once you develop a rating for that 
particular flight you can compare it against all the flights 
being offered in that market and assign it a percentage of 
the total traffic and that's the way the model flows the 
traffic. So, given a reasonable estimate of the traffic 
this is also a reasonable estimate of how that traffic will 
flow. Once we've developed an operating plan we can then 
translate that plan into the financial forecast for the 
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carriers and here we're showing an income statement 
generated in successive years '72, '73 and '74 for Mid-
Coast Airlines where we take into account all the revenues, 
all the expenses, develop operating income levels and 
finally net income levels in successive years. This also is 
computerized and can be generated over night in a very 
timely fashion. We develop sources and applications of fund 
statements which show the airlines where the money can be ex-
pected to corne from and where it will be applied and we can 
plot then the relationship between costs and revenue over a 
time frame. This is fairly typical of historic performance 
by most trunks where they were enjoying very profitable years 
because of this spread in the middle 1960's and then the 
tremendous squeeze that was put on them in 1970 and then 
we're forecasting a return to normal now. I mentioned that 
the yield is a problem. This reduction in cost per ton mile 
through the 1960's was achieved primarily because of transition 
from props to jets. Although we've had larger, more efficient 
airplanes coming in now in the terms of wide cabin equipment, 
the productivity gains are not enough to offset inflationary 
trends so we're seeing 1971 as a kind of water shed year 
where we're looking at rising costs in the rest of this decade, 
and we're making a further assumption that the CAB and the 
airlines through prudent and intelligent fare structure manage-
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ment will recognize this rise in costs and adjust fares 
upward to account for it. If that should occur, then I 
think we'll see airlines returning to a condition relatively 
good economic health through this decade. 
This shows the picture of the airline and with the event 
of these new aircraft corning in, how their debt structure is 
rising to over a billion dollars, but because they're growing 
tremendously and they're generating profits, their debt 
equity levels are holding fairly low, just quite a bit lower 
than they were a few years ago. 
Net income. It looks like a pretty impressive gain in 
net income. Again, the airline is tripling in size, so this 
kind of level is not terribly out of line and as you'll see 
on the next chart where we plotted the expected return on 
investment in the airline where they were down here at practi-
cally no return, now rising up by about 10% by the end of the 
decade. The CAB guide line for a reasonable rate of return 
from the airlines 12%, so I think what we're saying there 
is that things are going to get better, but not excessively. 
Q. Has the consideration of a four day week entered into 
any of your discussions? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you think that might occur? 
A. Yes, it sure could. 
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Q. Are you doing a twin jet? 
A. We're talking very seriously about building it, but we 
don't have it proven, but we are discussing it with many 
airlines. 
Q. If you built your usual quality, twin wide body,do you 
think you could crack the European market or do you think 
that they would buy they're own? Will they be forced .to 
buy their own? 
A. I might say that some of them would be forced to buy 
their own and that the preference factor for a European air-
line for an A300B would be in the order of maybe 15%. Other 
things being equal you could split the market and I think 
you would have to bias in favor of a European manufacturer 
because of the 15%. I think that the reverse would be true 
in the united states. 
Q. DO you think the civil Aviation Production and Finance 
Act has solved all, some or none of their financial problems? 
A. I'm not familiar with the details of the act. 
Q. What is the stopping order of the nelO twin. Is it the 
Chairman of the Board; is it a bank not lending the money? 
A. It's airline interest. 
Q. You can't get 2 or 3 airline orders? 
A. I'm not saying we can't, I'm saying we haven't yet, but 
think if we had the orders we'd build the airplane. 
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Q. Do you have an idea as to how many firm orders it would 
take? 
A. Yes, and that varies. The Chairman said he would like 
to have a hundred of them. 
Q. How long would it take if you decided to go ahead with 
this? 
A. About two years. We're talking now if we committed this 
summer. We'd be delivering in late '74, so slightly over 
2 years. 
Q. Are we going to have 3 companies building them again, 
do you think? 
A. I really doubt it. I think that if we enter it I doubt 
if Boeing would. Although Boeing might come along with an 
airplane with a super critical wing or an advanced 727 type 
or something like that. 
Q. You don't believe in a 747 twin? 
A. I don't know enough about it. I think that they have to 
cut the weights tremendously to make an effective airplane 
with the engine thrust that's available. If you can get the 
thrust up to say 55,000 lbs., it might be a pretty good airplane. 
Q. One more question. Your projections of the passenger miles 
were that you pretty well assumed that that was all going to 
be in the long haul of the large jet and that the difference 
between the characteristics between the large jet and the 
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smaller type airplane the sensitivities are such that one 
less larger aircraft means several less smaller aircraft so 
there's a great deal of leverage there and with a slower less 
sensitivity (this is one thing that I'm interested in) and 
the other thing that makes me ask this question is that it 
looks like a great market in the future are the non-U.S. 
domestic and non-European domestic but the rest of the world 
and it seems to me that the market there is for smaller airplanes. 
Have you looked at these sensitivities and what that means 
to the profits of the manufacturer? Are the profits low for 
a smaller airplane? 
A. Well, let's tackle the first part first. I assume you're 
relating to the forecast for MidCoast Airways with the increase 
of fleet? 
Q. No, your general forecast. How many long haul, large 
jumbo jets are going to be sold and then how many smaller 
aircraf~ are going to be sold, etc. 
A. We're assuming there that the bulk of that growth and that 
you're talking about the u.S. forecast is really going to be 
in the 11 domestic trunk carriers. They represent about 90% 
of the total productivity of the airlines structure in the 
u.S. The local service carriers are growing and have grown 
at a slightly faster rate than the trunks in the last couple 
of years, but they've got an awful long way to go to really 
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penetrate or to alter drastically those relationships. Now 
in that area I would see perhaps quite a shift in the STOL 
type aircraft, but I guess what we're saying is that conventional 
aircraft is still going to be doing the lion's share of the 
work for the next ten years or so. 
Q. You didn't say what the future wide bodies are going to 
be for third generation. 
A. I don't really know. I think that there will be super 
critical wing airplanes, cruising close to Mach I and com-
posites, but we're also talking about slow supersonics that 
swing with a pivotal wing. 
